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Abstract:
Purpose: The aim of  this paper is to investigate the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) network
equilibrium with the consideration of  three practical factors: two complementary types of
suppliers, risk-averse character of  the manufacturer and capacity constraints of  the suppliers. 
Design/methodology/approach: The equilibrium of  various decision makers including the
suppliers, the manufacturers, the retailers, the collectors and the demand markets are modeled
via finite-dimensional variational inequality, respectively. Then the governing CLSC network
equilibrium model is established. The logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction-correction
algorithm is designed to solve the variational inequality model. Numerical examples are given
to analyze the impact of  return rate, risk-averse degree and capacity constraints on the network
equilibrium under different product BOMs.
Findings: With the increase of  return rate, the profits of  various channel members and the
performance of  the CLSC system will improve. There is a contradiction between profit
maximization and risk minimization for the manufacturers. Moreover, the economic behavior
of  the CLSC is likely to be limited by the capacity constraints of  the suppliers.
Originality/value: Prior to this paper, few papers have addressed with the CLSC network
equilibrium considering some practical factors. They assume all the suppliers are identical and
-509-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1336
all the decision-makers are risk neutral. Furthermore, the production capacities of  all suppliers
are assumed to be infinite or large enough. To fill the gap, this paper examines the influences
of  two-type suppliers, risk aversion and capacity constraints upon the CLSC network
equilibrium.
Keywords: closed-loop supply chain network, variational inequalities, multi-type suppliers, risk averse,
capacity constraints
1. Introduction
Remanufacturing and closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management can not only protect
environment, promote sustainable development and but also make the firms earn more profits
(Guide & Wassenhove, 2006; Atasu, Guide & Wassenhove, 2008). Therefore, they have
received great attention from the entrepreneurs in recent years. Many famous companies,
such as BMW, IBM, Kodak and Fuji Xerox, just to name a few, have established effective end-
of-life (EOL) product collection and remanufacturing systems besides their traditional
production and distribution facility. 
Correspondingly, in academia, many scholars also have done plenty of research on CLSC
management to guide practice. In general, most of the literature deals with tactical and
operational issues, such as reverse channel structure, pricing strategies of new and
remanufactured products, inventory control and logistics network design. Savaskan,
Bhattacharya and Wassenhove (2004) analyzed the reverse channel choice problem in CLSC
and proved that retailer-collection mode is optimal. Shi, Zhang and Sha (2011) developed a
mathematical model to maximize the overall profit of the CLSC system by simultaneously
determining the selling price, the production quantities for brand-new products and
remanufactured products. Golinska and Kawa (2011) provided a framework for management of
reverse flow of materials in automotive industry, and utilized agent-based technology to find
the optimal solutions for the dynamic network configuration. Zhu and Xu (2012) built an
integrated optimization model for a CLSC network under uncertainty, and solved the model by
hybrid genetic algorithm. But they failed to recognize the CLSC as a business process and
ignored the important strategic issue of competition.
Under a competitive environment, Majumder and Groenevelt (2001) presented a two-period
model of remanufacturing in the face of competition between an original equipment
manufacturer (OEM) and a local remanufacturer. Savaskan and Wassenhove (2006)
investigated the optimal reverse channel design in a CLSC with one manufacturer and two
competing retailers. Research by (Webster & Mitra 2007; Mitra & Webster, 2008) examined the
impact of take-back laws and government subsidies within an OEM/remanufacturer competitive
framework, respectively. Other related research includes Debo, Toktay and Wassenhove
(2005), Ferguson and Toktay (2006), Chen and Chang (2012), Örsdemir, Kemahlıoğlu-Ziya and
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Parlaktürk (2014) and so on. Although the literatures lay a solid foundation for future research,
they only discuss the competition between an OEM and a remanufacturing or between two
retailers who are dealing with a single demand market. 
In fact, as we know, the CLSC is likely to have a wider variety of channel members and
complex competitive relations. For example, a complete CLSC may have several mutual
competitive suppliers, competitive manufacturers, competitive retailers, competitive collectors
and several demand markets. As noted in Nagurney, Dong and Zhang (2002), such type of
competition could be the main driver of the supply chain profitability and therefore, needs to
be analyzed more in depth. 
There are a few papers studying the competition among multiple kinds of channel members in
reverse supply chain network or CLSC networks. Nagurney and Toyasaki (2005) constructed a
multitiered network equilibrium framework for electronic waste recycling using the variational
inequality method. Hammond and Beullens (2007) expanded the model of Nagurney and
Toyasaki (2005) to build an oligopolistic CLSC network model including manufacturers and
demand markets under WEEE legislation. Yang, Wang and Li (2009) used variational inequality
method to model the five-echelon CLSC network including suppliers, manufacturers, retailers,
recovery centers and consumer markets. Qiang, Ke, Anderson and Dong (2013) established a
CLSC network model considering the competition, distribution channel investment and
uncertainties. Wakolbinger, Toyasaki, Nowak and Nagurney (2014) formulated the e-waste
network flow model as a variational inequality problem to analyze how technical, market, and
legislative factors influence the total amount of e-waste that is collected, recycled, exported
and (legally and illegally) disposed off. 
However, the above mentioned network models didn’t consider the case of multi-type
suppliers. In reality, the manufacturers need cooperate with many different types of providers,
such as multi-type raw material or component suppliers, so the premise that all suppliers are
identical may be inappropriate; In addition, most literature assumed the production capacity of
all suppliers are infinite or large enough, but in fact the quantity of raw materials supplied to
the manufacturers are usually limited by the capacity of the suppliers. Furthermore, the
characteristics of decision-makers’ risk attitudes are seldom considered in the previous models.
To fill the gap, this paper studies the CLSC network equilibrium model with the consideration of
three distinct factors: two complementary types of suppliers, capacity constraints of the
suppliers and the manufacturers’ risk-averse character, then analyzes the impact of these
factors on the equilibrium solutions combined with numerical examples and provides several
meaningful management insights.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we derive the optimality conditions
of the various decision-makers by finite-dimensional variational inequality theory and
formulate the whole CLSC network’ equilibrium model. In Section 3, we present the
computational algorithm for solving the Nash equilibrium. We conduct numerical examples and
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sensitivity analysis in Section 4 to generate managerial insights from our model. Finally,
conclusions and suggestions for future research are given in section 5. 
2. Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Model
The general CLSC network investigated is illustrated in Figure 1, which consists of the forward
supply chain network and the reverse supply chain network. In the forward network, two
groups of J1 and J2 suppliers provide two complementary types of raw materials respectively
for M manufacturers who are involved in the production of homogeneous products, which are
then shipped to N retailers, who, in turn, sell the products in K demand markets. In the
reverse network, I collectors pick up the EOL products from the demand markets, gather, clean
and deliver them back to the manufacturers for remanufacturing. In Figure 1, the real lines
express the forward transactions between the suppliers and the manufacturers, the
manufacturers and the retailers, the retailers and the demand markets; the dashed lines
illustrate the reverse transactions between the demand markets and the collectors, the
collectors and the manufactures. Moreover, it is assumed the remanufactured products and the
new products are indistinguishable. In other words, there are no perceived quality and
reliability depreciation of the two kinds of products for the consumers.
Figure 1. The structure of CLSC network with two-type suppliers
2.1 The Equilibrium of the Suppliers and their Optimality Conditions
Let q1 j1m
r R+
M ,q2 j2m
r R+
M , denote the raw material shipment between a typical supplier j1, j2 and
a typical manufacturer m, and group the shipments between all pairs of suppliers and
manufacturers into the column vector (Q1,Q2)R+
J1M+J 2M . Let f 1 j 1(qJ1
r ) and f 2 j 2(qJ2
r ) denote the
production cost of supplier j1 and j2 respectively, which means the cost of supplier j1, j2 depend
not only on his own raw material output but also on those of the other suppliers. The
transaction cost undertaken by the supplier between supplier j1, j2 and manufacturer m is
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denoted by c j1m(q1 j1m
r ),c j2m(q2 j 2m
r ) respectively, and the transaction price associated with
supplier j1, j2 and manufacturer m is denoted by ρ j1m
✳ , ρ j 2m
✳ . Let C1 j1 and C2 j2 represent the upper
bound of the production capacity for the 1st-type supplier j1 and 2nd-type supplier j2,
respectively. Moreover, assume f 1 j 1(qJ1
r ),f 2 j2(q J2
r ) and c j1m(q1 j1m
r ),c j2m(q2 j 2m
r ) are continuous,
differentiable and convex functions.
Given the notations and assumptions mentioned above, the profit maximization problem of
each supplier j1 can be expressed as
max
q1 j
1
r ≥0
π j 1(qJ1)=∑
m=1
M
ρ j1m
✳ q1 j1m
r −f 1 j1(qJ 1
r )−∑
m=1
M
c j1m(q1 j 1m
r ) (1)
s .t . q1 j1
r ≤C1 j1, ∑
m=1
M
q1 j1m
r ≤q1 j1
r (2)
Equation (1) states that the profit of the 1st-type supplier is equal to sales revenues of raw
materials minus the costs associated with production and transactions. The first inequality of
constraint set (2) means the production quantity of the 1st-type raw material by the supplier
should be no more than the upper bound of his capacity. The second inequality of constraint
set (2) means the transaction volumes between the supplier and all the manufacturers must
not exceed his production quantity.
The profit maximization problem of each supplier j2 can be expressed as 
max
q1 j
2
r ≥0
π j2(qJ2)=∑
m=1
M
ρ j 2m
✳ q2 j2m
r −f 2 j 2(qJ2
r )−∑
m=1
M
c j2m(q2 j2m
r ) (3)
s. t . q2 j2
r ≤C 2 j 2 ,∑
m=1
M
q2 j 2m
r ≤q2 j2
r (4)
Similar as Equation (1) and constraint set (2), we can explain Equation (3) and constraint set
(4) for the 2nd-type supplier.
Because the same type suppliers compete in a non-cooperative fashion, the optimality
conditions for both type of suppliers can be expressed simultaneously using the following
variational inequality: determine the optimal solution (qJ1
r✳ ,qJ2
r✳ ,Q1
✳
,Q2
✳
)ΩS , satisfying
∑
j1=1
J 1
∑
m=1
M
[
∂c j1m(q1 j1 m
r )
∂q1 j 1m
r −ρ j1m
✳ ]x [q1 j1 m
r −q1 j 1m
r ✳ ]+∑
j 1=1
J1 ∂f 1 j 1(q1 J 1
✳ )
∂q1 j 1
x [q1 j 1−q1 j 1
✳ ]
+∑
j2=1
J2
∑
m=1
M
[
∂c j 2m(q2 j2 m
r )
∂q2 j2 m
r
−ρ j 2m
✳ ]x [q2 j2 m
r −q2 j 2m
r ✳ ]+∑
j2=1
J2 ∂f 2 j2 (q2 J 2
✳ )
∂q2 j2
x [q2 j2−q2 j 2
✳ ]≥0
∀(qJ1
r ,qJ2
r ,Q1,Q2)∈ΩS
(5)
Where Ωs={(qJ 1r ,qJ2r ,Q1 ,Q2)∈R+J1+J2+J 1M+J 2M|q1 j 1r ≤C1 j 1,q2 j 2r ≤C2 j 2,∑
m=1
M
q1 j1 m
r ≤q1 J 1
r ,∑
m=1
M
q2 j2 m
r ≤q2 J 2
r }
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2.2 The Equilibrium of the Manufacturers and their Optimality Conditions
Each unit of product is made up of b1 unit of 1st-type raw material and b2 unit of 2nd-type raw
material, which is the so-called “Bills of Materials (BOM)”. 
Let qm denote the non-negative production output by raw materials of manufacturer m, and
group the production output of all manufacturers into the column vector qR+
M . The product
shipment between manufacturer m and retailer n is denoted by qmn; the product shipments
between all pairs of manufacturers and retailers are grouped into a column vector Q3R+
MN .
Denote ρ mn
✳ as the price charged for the product by manufacturer m to retailer n. The EOL
product transaction volume between collector i and manufacturer m is denoted by qim; the EOL
product transaction volumes between all pairs of manufacturers and collectors are grouped
into a column vector Q4∈R+
MI . Let qm
u denote the quantity of the EOL products that
manufacturer m decides to remanufacture, and group all these qm
u into the column vector qu ,
then it is straightforward to obtain qm
u ≤∑i=1
I
q i m . Denote ρ im
✳ as the price charged for the EOL
product by collector i to manufacturer m.
Each manufacturer m is face with the production cost of the raw materials fm(q) and the
remanufacturing cost of the EOL products f m
u (qu) respectively. Assume these two functions are
continuous, differentiable and convex. The transaction cost undertaken by the manufacturer
between manufacturer m and retailer n is a function of cmn=cmn(qmn). Moreover, in order to
express competition among manufacturers, it is assumed that fm(q) depends not only on the
production output of manufacturer m but also on those of the other manufacturers. 
Given the above notations and assumptions, we can express the criterion of profit
maximization for manufacturer m as:
maxπm(q,q
u ,Q1,Q2 ,Q3 ,Q4)=∑
n=1
N
ρmn
✳ qmn−f m(q)−∑
n=1
N
cmn(qmn)−∑
j1=1
J 1
ρ 1 j 1m
✳ q1 j 1m
−∑
j2=1
J 2
ρ 2 j2m
✳ q2 j 2m−∑
i=1
I
ρ i m
✳ qi m−f m
u (qm
u )
(6)
where Ωm
M={(qm,q j 1m,q j2m,qmn ,qmu ,qim)R+1+J 1+ J2+N+1+I|∑n=1
N
qmn≤qm+qm
u ,β 1 qm≤∑
j 1=1
J1
q1 j1m
β 2 qm≤∑
j2=1
J2
q2 j 2m,qm
u≤∑
i=1
I
qi m } (7)
Equation (6) indicates that the profit of the manufacturer is equal to sales revenues of new and
remanufactured products minus the production and remanufacturing costs, the buy-back costs
of EOL products and the transaction costs with the suppliers and the retailers. The first
inequality of constraint set (7) means the shipments of products between the manufacturer
and all the retailers should be equal to or less than the sum of the production output and the
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remanufacturing output. The second inequality of constraint set (7) means that the
manufacturer’s production quantity of new products should be constrained by the quantity of
1st-type raw material purchased from the suppliers dividing by the number of the 1st-type raw
material in each product according to the BOM. The explanation of the third inequality is
similar as the second one. The fourth inequality of constraint set (7) means the quantity of the
EOL products that the manufacturer intends to remanufacture is less than or equal to the
transaction volumes between him and all the collectors.
Moreover, we assume that with the consideration of the risk associated with purchasing raw
materials from the two-type suppliers, shipping the products to the various retailers and
obtaining EOL products from the collectors, all the manufacturers are characteristic of risk
aversion. Therefore, besides the criterion of profit maximization each manufacturer is
concerned with risk minimization. The risk level perceived by a typical manufacturer may be
dependent not only on the flows he controls but also upon those controlled by other
manufacturers. Hence, the second criterion of manufacturer m can be expressed as (Zsidisin,
2003; Nagurney, Cruz, Dong & Zhang, 2005): 
min
q j1m≥0,q j 2m≥0,qmn≥0,q im≥0
rm=rm(Q
1,Q2 ,Q3,Q4),∀m (8)
Each manufacturer associates a non-negative risk-averse degree lm with the risk minimization
criterion (8). Hence, the multi-criterion decision-making problem for manufacturer m can be
transformed into a single objective optimization problem (Keeney & Raiffa, 1993):
maxUm(q ,q
u ,Q1 ,Q2 ,Q3 ,Q4)=∑
n=1
N
ρmn
✳ qmn−f m(q)−∑
n=1
N
cmn (qmn)−∑
j 1=1
J1
ρ1 j1 m
✳ q j 1m
−∑
j2=1
J 2
ρ 2 j2m
✳ q j 2m−∑
i=1
I
ρ i m
✳ qi m−f m
u (qu )−λ mrm(Q
1 ,Q2 ,Q3,Q4)
(9)
We presume that the transaction cost functions and the risk functions for each manufacturer
are continuous and convex. Because all the manufacturers compete non-cooperatively, the
optimal conditions for all the manufacturers can be described as the following variational
inequality: determine the optimal (q*, qu*, Q1*, Q2*, Q3*,Q4*)  M, satisfying: 
∑
m=1
M ∂ fm (q
✳)
∂qm
x [qm−qm
✳ ]+∑
m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
[
∂ cmn (qmn
✳ )
∂qmn
−ρmn
✳ +λ m
∂rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2✳ ,Q3 ✳,Q4✳)
∂qmn
]x [qmn−qmn
✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M
∑
j1=1
J1
[ ρ1 j1 m
✳ +λ m
∂rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2✳ ,Q3 ✳,Q4✳ )
∂q1 j1m
]x[q1 j 1m
r −q1 j1 m
r ✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M
∑
j2=1
J2
[ ρ2 j2 m
✳ +λ m
∂rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2✳ ,Q3 ✳,Q4✳ )
∂q2 j2m
]x[q2 j 2m
r −q2 j2 m
r ✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M
∑
i=1
I
[ ρ i m
✳ +λm
∂ rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2 ✳,Q3✳ ,Q4 ✳)
∂qi m
]x [qi m−qi m
✳ ]+∑
m=1
M ∂f m(q
u ✳)
∂qm
u
x [qm
u −qm
u ✳ ]≥0
∀(q,qu ,Q1 ,Q2 ,Q3 ,Q4)∈ΩM
(10)
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Where Ωm
M={(q ,qu,Q1 ,Q2,Q3,Q4)∈R+2M+J 1M+J 2M+MN+IM|∑n=1
N
qmn≤qm+qm
u ,β 1qm≤∑
j 1=1
J1
q1 j1 m
β 2qm≤∑
j 2=1
J 2
q2 j2 m ,qm
u ≤∑
i=1
I
qi m } .
2.3 The Equilibrium of the Retailers and their Optimality Conditions
The retailers transact with the manufacturers as well as the consumers. Specifically, they need
to decide how much to order from the manufactures in order to deal with the demand markets
while seeking to maximize their profits. 
Let sn=∑m=1
M
qmn , in turn, denote the total order quantity at retailer n that he obtains from all
the manufacturers, and group these purchased amounts into the column vector sR+
N . The
retailer n is faced with what we term a handling cost, which may include the display and
storage cost associated with the product. Let cn(sn) denote this cost function and it is
continuous, differentiable and convex. 
The product shipment between retailer n and demand market k is denoted by qnk; the product
shipments between all pairs of retailers and demand markets are grouped into a column vector
Q5R+
NK . The retailer n has associated transaction costs in regard to transacting with the
demand market k. Let cnk(qnk) represent this cost. In addition, the transaction price between
retailer n and demand market k is denoted by ρ nk
✳ . 
For retailer n, his maximum profit model is
maxπ n(Q
3 ,Q5)=ρ nk
✳ ∑
k=1
K
qnk−cn(sn)−∑
m=1
M
ρmn qmn−∑
k=1
K
cnk (qnk ) (11)
where Ωn
R={(qmn,qnk)R+M+K |sn=∑m=1
M
qmn,∑
k=1
K
qnk≤∑
m=1
M
qmn} (12)
Equation (11) indicates that the profit of the retailer is equal to sales revenues of new and
remanufactured products minus the handling cost, the purchasing costs paid to the
manufacturers and the transaction costs with the collectors. The equality in constraint set (12)
means that the handling quantity at the retailer’s should be equal to the quantity of the
products he purchases from all the manufacturers. The inequality in constraint set (12) means
that the total sale volumes from the retailer to all the demand markets should be no more than
the retailer obtains from all the manufacturers.  
-516-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1336
Because all the retailers compete in a non-cooperative fashion, the optimality conditions for all
retailers can be expressed as the variational inequality: determine the optimal (Q3,Q5)  R,
satisfying:
∑
k=1
k
∑
n=1
N
[
∂cnk (qnk
✳ )
∂qnk
−ρ nk
✳ ]x [qnk−qnk
✳ ]+∑
n=1
N
∑
m=1
M
[ρmn
✳ +
∂cn (sn
✳ )
∂qmn
]x [qmn−qmn
✳ ]≥0,∀(Q3 ,Q5)∈ΩR (13)
Where ΩR={(Q3,Q5)∈R+MN+NK|sn=∑
m=1
M
qmn,∑
k=1
K
qnk≤∑
m=1
M
qmn} .
2.4 The Equilibrium of the Demand Markets
The consumers in the demand markets transact with the retailers as well as the collectors.
Specifically, in the forward supply chain, the consumers need to decide the purchasing quantity
of the products and the price they are willing to pay. In the reverse supply chain, the
consumers should decide the quantity of EOL products that will be returned to the collectors. 
In the forward supply chain, let rk denote the price of the products at demand market k and
group all these rk into a column vector ρ R+
k . Further, denote the demand of the products at
demand market k as dk(r), which is a monotone decreasing function with respect to the prices
of all the markets. In addition, c^nk (qnk)  is introduced to represent the transaction costs
undertaken by the consumers in demand market k while buying the products from retailer n.
Now we can give the following equations according to the spatial price equilibrium theory
(Nagurney et al., 2002). 
For retailer n, 
ρ nk
✳ +c^nk(qnk
✳ ){=ρ k✳ , ρ nk✳ >0≥ρ k✳ ,ρ nk✳ =0 (14)
and for demand market k,
dk (ρ
✳){=∑n=1
N
qnk
✳ , ρ k
✳>0
≤∑n=1
N
qnk
✳ ,ρ k
✳=0
(15)
Equation (14) states that if the consumer at demand market k purchases the products from
retailer n, then the price charged by the retailer for the product plus the unit transaction cost
undertaken by the consumer does not exceed the price that the consumer is willing to pay.
Equation (15) states that if the price that the consumer at demand market k is willing to pay is
positive, and then the quantities purchased of the product should exactly be equal to the
demand (Nagurney et al., 2002). 
Let qik denote the EOL product transaction volume between collector i and demand market k,
and group all these qik into a column vector Q6R+
IK . In the reverse supply chain, the
consumers’ behaviors can be characterized by Equation (16) subject to constraint (17).
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Equation (16) means that the customers at demand market k need to choose the quantities of
EOL products returned to collector i corresponding to the value of the buy-back price. Herein
ak(Q6) represents the consumer disutility function at demand market k for handing over the
EOL products, which is a monotone increasing function depending on the collection quantity.
That is, the more EOL products collector i wants to obtain, the higher buy-back price he has to
offer. Constraint (17) means that the amount of the EOL products demand market k decides to
return should be less than or equal to the amount purchased in the forward supply chain
multiply the return ratio m (Hammond & Beullens, 2007; Yang et al., 2009). 
a k(Q
6 ✳){=ρ ik✳ ,if qik>0≤ρ ik✳ ,if q ik=0 (16)
s .t . ∑i=1
I
qik≤μ∑n=1
N
qnk,∀k (17)
Combining consumer behaviors in both forward and reverse supply chains, the equilibrium
conditions for all the demand markets can be expressed as the following variational inequality:
determine the optimal (r, Q5,Q6)  C, satisfying:
∑
k=1
K [∑n=1
N
qnk
✳ −d k(ρ
✳)]x(ρ k−ρ k✳ )+∑n=1
N
∑
k=1
K
[ρ nk
✳ + c^nk(qnk
✳ )−ρ k ]x [qnk−qnk
✳ ]
+∑
k=1
K
∑
i=1
I
[a k(Q
6)−ρ ik
✳ ]x [qik−qik
✳ ]≥0
(18)
Where ΩC={(ρ ,Q5 ,Q6)∈R+K+NK +IK|∑
i=1
I
q ik≤μ∑
n=1
N
qnk } . 
2.5 The Equilibrium of the Collectors and their Optimality Conditions
The collectors transact with the demand markets as well as the manufacturers. They need to
decide the collection quantity of the EOL products from the demand markets and the
transaction volumes with the manufacturers. 
Let t i=∑k=1
K
qik , in turn, denote the total volume of the EOL products at collector i that he
obtains from all the demand markets, and group these amounts into the column vector t R+
I .
The collectors clean, inspect and classify the EOL products before transacting with the
manufacturers. The corresponding processing cost of collector i depends not only on his own
but also on those of the other collectors in order to embody competition. Let cim(qim) denote
the transaction cost function undertaken by the collector between collectors i and
manufacturer m. Let b3 represent the proportion that the quantity of remanufacturable
products accounts for that of all the EOL products and satisfy b3  (0,1]. Moreover, the
government provides the collectors with unit subsidy u for each EOL product collected to
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stimulate the development of reverse logistics. Therefore, collector i can obtain the aggregate
subsidy υ∑k=1
K
q ik . 
For collector i, his maximum profit model is
maxπ i (Q
4 ,Q6)=∑
m=1
M
ρ i m
✳ qi m+υ∑
k=1
K
q ik−∑
k=1
K
ρ ik
✳ qik−∑
m=1
M
c i m(qi m)−c i (t ) (19)
s .t . ∑m=1
M
qi m≤β 3∑k=1
K
q ik ,∀ i (20)
Equation (19) indicates that the profit of the collector is equal to sales revenues of EOL
products plus the government subsidies minus the collection costs from the demand markets,
the transaction costs with the manufacturers and the processing costs. Constraint (20) means
that the transaction volumes between the collector and all the manufacturers should be no
more than the amount that he transacts with all the demand markets multiplies the ratio of the
remanufacturable EOL products. 
Because all the collectors compete in a non-cooperative fashion, the optimality conditions for
all collectors can be expressed as the variational inequality: determine the optimal
(Q4 ,Q6)∈R+
MI+IK , satisfying： 
∑
i=1
I
∑
m=1
M
[
∂c i m(q i m
✳ )
∂qi m
−ρ i m
✳ ]x [qi m−qi m
✳ ]+∑
i=1
I
∑
k=1
K
[
∂c ik (q ik
✳ )
∂q ik
+
∂ c i (t
✳)
∂q i m
−υ+ρ ik
✳ ]x [qik−q ik
✳ ]≥0,
∀(Q4,Q6)∈ΩI
(21)
Where ΩI={(Q4 ,Q6)∈R+MI+KI|∑
m=1
M
qi m≤β 3∑
k=1
K
qik } . 
2.6 The Governing Equilibrium Condition of the CLSC Network
In equilibrium state, the optimality conditions for all suppliers, all manufacturers, all retailers,
all collectors and the demand market equilibrium conditions must be satisfied simultaneously.
Hence, we can obtain the governing equilibrium condition of the CLSC network. 
Theorem
The governing equilibrium condition of the CLSC network is given by the following variational
inequalities: determine (q1 J1
✳ ,q1 J2
✳ ,q✳ ,Q1✳ ,Q2✳ ,Q3✳ ,Q4 ✳ ,Q5✳ ,Q6✳ ,qu✳ ,ρ ✳)Ω , satisfying:
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∑
j1=1
J 1 ∂f 1 j 1(q1 J1
✳ )
∂q1 j1
x [q1 j1−q1 j1
✳ ]+∑
j 2=1
J2 ∂f 2 j2(q2 J 2
✳ )
∂q2 j 2
x [q2 j2−q2 j 2
✳ ]
+∑
j1=1
J1
∑
m=1
M
[
∂ c j1m (q1 j1m
r ✳ )
∂q1 j1 m
r
+λ m
∂rm (Q
1✳ ,Q2 ✳,Q3✳ ,Q4 ✳)
∂q1 j1 m
r
]x [q1 j1 m
r −q1 j1m
r ✳ ]
+∑
j2=1
J2
∑
m=1
M
[
∂ c j2m (q2 j2m
r ✳ )
∂q2 j2 m
r +λ m
∂rm (Q
1✳ ,Q2 ✳,Q3✳ ,Q4 ✳)
∂q2 j2 m
r ]x [q2 j2 m
r −q2 j2m
r ✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M ∂f m (q
✳)
∂qm
x [qm−qm
✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M
∑
n=1
N
[
∂ cmn(qmn
✳ )
∂qmn
+
∂ cn(s
✳)
∂qmn
+λm
∂ rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2 ✳ ,Q3 ✳,Q4 ✳)
∂qmn
]x [qmn−qmn
✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M
∑
i=1
I
[
∂ ci m (qi m
✳ )
∂q i m
+λm
∂ rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2 ✳ ,Q3✳ ,Q4 ✳)
∂qi m
]x [qi m−qi m
✳ ]
∑
k=1
K
∑
n=1
N
[
∂cnk (qnk
✳ )
∂qnk
+cnk (qnk
✳ )−ρk ]x[qnk−qnk
✳ ]
+∑
i=1
I
∑
k=1
K
[
∂c ki (q ik
✳ )
∂qik
+
∂ ci (t
✳)
∂q i m
−υ+α k(Q
6 ✳)]x [q ik−qik
✳ ]
+∑
m=1
M ∂f m (q
u ✳ )
∂qm
u
x[qm
u−qm
u ✳ ]+∑
k=1
K
[∑n=1N qnk✳ −dn(ρ ✳) ]x[ ρk−ρ k✳ ]≥0
∀(qJ1
r ,q J2
r ,Q1 ,Q2,q,Q3,Q4,Q5,Q6,qu,ρ )∈Ω
(22)
where =s x M x N x C x I.
Proof
With some algebraic manipulation, it can be seen that varational inequality (22) and its
constraint set is indeed the sum of inequalities (5), (10), (13), (18) and (21) and their
constraint sets.
Let ζ=(ζ 1,... ,ζ j1,... ,ζ J1)
TR+
J 1 , δ =(δ 1 , ...,δ j 2 ,...,δ J 2)
T∈R+
J2 , ε=(ε1, ...,ε j 1, ...,εJ 1)
T∈R+
J 1 ,
ψ=(ψ 1, ...,ψ j2 ,... ,ψ J2)
TR+
J 2 , ϕ=(ϕ 1,... ,ϕm,... ,ϕM)
T R+
M , χ=( χ 1,..., χm, ..., χ M)
TR+
M ,
ω=(ω 1,... ,ωm,...,ωM)
TR+
M , γ=(γ 1,... ,γ m,...,γ M)
T R+
M , η=(η1,... ,η n,...,ηN)
TR+
N ,
τ=(τ 1,... ,τ k ,...,τ K )
T R+
K , θ=(θ 1,...,θ i ,... ,θ I)
TR+
I be Lagranian multipliers column vector with
respect to the constraints q1 j1
r ≤C1 j 1 , q2 j2
r ≤C2 j 2 , ∑
m=1
M
q j1m≤q1 j1
r , ∑
m=1
M
q j2m≤q2 j2
r , β 1qm≤∑
j1=1
J1
q1 j 1m ,
β 2qm≤∑
j2=1
J2
q2 j 2m , qm
u ≤∑
i=1
I
qi m , ∑
n=1
N
qmn≤qm+qm
u , ∑
k=1
K
qnk≤∑
m=1
M
qmn , ∑
i=1
I
qik≤μ∑
n=1
N
qnk  a n d
∑
m=1
M
q i m≤β 3∑
k=1
K
q ik  respectively.
When the governing network model is determined, the endogenous price variables can be
retrieved by means of the method introduced in Nagurney et al. (2002) and Yang et al. (2009),
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that is: 
ρ j 1m
✳ =∂c j1 m(q1 j 1m
r ✳ )/∂q1 j 1m
r +ε j1
✳ ;ρ j 2m
✳ =∂ c j2 m(q2 j2m
r ✳ )/ ∂q2 j 2m
r +ψ j2
✳ ;
ρmn
✳ =∂cmn(qmn
✳ )/∂qmn+ γm
✳ +λ m∂rm(Q
1 ✳,Q2✳ ,Q3 ✳,Q4✳)/ ∂qmn; ρnk
✳ =∂cnk (qnk
✳ )/∂qnk+ ηn
✳;
ρ ik
✳ =α k (Q
6)+τ k
✳ ;ρ i m
✳ =∂c i m(q i m
✳ )/∂q i m+θ i
✳.
3. Network Equilibrium Algorithm
For easy formulation in the following, we group the terms of the multiplication signs in
inequality (22) into a column vector
F (y )={F j11 ,F j22 ,F j1m3 ,F j2 m4 ,F m5 ,F mn6 ,F i m7 ,F nk8 ,F ik9 ,F m10 ,F k11}∀ j 1, j2,m, n,k , i and introduce
y={qJ 1r ,qJ2r ,Q1,Q2,q ,Q3 ,Q4,Q5 ,Q6,qu,ρ }∈Ω ; thus we can rewrite the variational inequality
problem (22) in the standard form: determine
y✳={qJ 1r
✳
,qJ 2
r✳ ,Q1✳ ,Q2✳ ,q✳ ,Q3✳ ,Q4✳ ,Q2✳ ,Q6 ✳ ,qu✳ , ρ ✳} Ω , satisfying:
F (y)T ·(y−y✳ )≥0,∀ y Ω (23)
The feasible domain of variational inequality (23) is defined on a polyhedral set of non-
negative orthant. As a consequence, the production capacity constraints induce ineffectiveness
of the modified projection method proposed by Korpelevich (1976). Fortunately, the
logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction-correction (LQP-PC) method developed by He, Xu
and Yuan (2006) can be applied for solving this variational inequality problem. LQP-PC method
provides an iterative solution framework that can not only get the optimal solutions and
Lagrangian multipliers simultaneously, but also has faster convergence and higher accuracy
compared with the modified projection method. Therefore, in this paper we employ LQP-PC
method to solve variational inequality (23). To implement LQP-PC method effectively, it is
essential to transform the constraint set into the form of partitioned matrix firstly, and then
carry out the prediction and correction procedures while adjusting the step size adaptively. We
refer the readers to the work such as Meng, Huang and Cheu (2009) to reach a comprehensive
understanding.
4. Numerical Examples
Now consider a CLSC network which consists of two competitive 1st-type suppliers, two
competitive 2nd-type suppliers, two competitive manufacturers, two competitive retailers, two
competitive collectors and two demand markets. The raw material cost functions of four
suppliers are f 11(q J1
r )=2.5q11
r 2+q11
r q12
r +q11
r , f 12(q J1
r )=2.5q12
r 2+q11
r q12
r +q12
r , f 21(qJ 2
r )=2q21
r 2+q21
r q22
r +q21
r ,
and f 22(q J2
r )=2q22
r 2+q22
r q21
r +q22
r , respectively. The transaction cost functions undertaken by the
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suppliers between supplier j1, j2 and manufacturer m are c j 1m(q1 j1 m
r )=(q1 j1 m
r )2+0.1,∀ j1,∀m and
c j 2m(q2 j2 m
r )=(q2 j2 m
r )2+0.1,∀ j2,∀m , respectively. 
The production cost function of manufacturer m is f m(q)=4qm
2 +qmq3−m+2qm, m=1,2 . 
The remanufacturing cost function of manufacturer m is f 1(q
u)=(qm
u )2+qm
u q3−m
u +qm
u , m=1,2 . 
The transactions cost function undertaken by the manufacturer between manufacturer m and
retailer n is cmn(qmn)=4qmn
2 +2.5qmn, m=1,2; n=1,2 .
The transactions cost function undertaken by the collector between collector i and
manufacturer m is c i m(q i m)=0.5qi m
2 +0.5qim , i=1,2 ; m=1,2 . 
The handling cost of retailer n is cn(sn)=8sn
2 , n=1,2.  
The processing cost of collector i is c i(t )=0.2(∑k=1
2
qki)
2
+0.1, i=1,2 . 
The unit subsidy for each EOL product collected is u=2. 
The proportion the quantity of remanufacturable products accounts for that of all the EOL
products is b3=0.96.
The transactions cost function undertaken by the demand market between retailer n and
demand market k is c^nk(qnk)=qnk+5, n=1,2, k=1,2 . 
The consumer disutility function at demand market k is a k(Q6)=0.5(∑ i=1
2
∑k=1
2
qik)+5 . 
The transactions cost function undertaken by the retailer between retailer n and demand
market k is cnk(qnk)=4qnk
2 +5, n=1,2, k=1,2 . 
The demand functions at demand markets are d1(r)=400-10r1-2r2 and d2(r)=400-10r2-2r1. 
Implementing the LQP-PC method for the example can yield the equilibrium solutions of the
CLSC model with and without capacity constraints. The convergence criterion of the LQP-PC
algorithm is set that the absolute value of difference of decision variables and Lagrange
multipliers between two steps is lower than or equal to 10-8. Here we list and illustrate the
results of the followed four cases.
Example 1: Set the risk-averse degree of the manufacturers lm=0.3, m=1,2. Investigate the
impact of return rate on the transaction prices, transaction volumes and the profits of two
types of suppliers, manufacturers, retailers and collectors under different product BOMs, as
shown in Table 1. 
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b1 = 2, b2 = 1 b1 = 1, b2 = 2 b1 = 2, b2 = 2
m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6 m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6 m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6
q1 j1m
r 0.6074 0.5728 0.5172 0.3148 0.2956 0.2656 0.5079 0.4952 0.4630
q2 j2m
r 0.3037 0.2864 0.2586 0.6295 0.5913 0.5312 0.5079 0.4952 0.4630
qm 0.4930 0.5508 0.6099 0.5110 0.5685 0.6264 0.4123 0.4762 0.5460
qm
u 0.1893 0.2644 0.3513 0.1962 0.2729 0.3608 0.1583 0.2286 0.3145
qmn 0.2465 0.2754 0.3049 0.2555 0.2843 0.3132 0.2061 0.2381 0.2730
qnk 0.2465 0.2754 0.3049 0.2555 0.2843 0.3132 0.2061 0.2381 0.2730
qik 0.0986 0.1377 0.1830 0.1022 0.1421 0.1879 0.0825 0.1190 0.1638
qim 0.0947 0.1322 0.1756 0.0981 0.1364 0.1804 0.0792 0.1143 0.1573
rk 33.2922 33.2874 33.2825 33.2908 33.2860 33.2811 33.2990 33.2937 33.2878
π j1 0.9068 0.7844 0.6025 0.0972 0.0622 0.0116 0.5740 0.5357 0.4432
π j2 0.0306 0.0051 -0.0328 0.7908 0.6739 0.5055 0.4450 0.4131 0.3360
pm 1.013 1.1051 1.1505 0.9988 1.0597 1.0731 0.6962 0.8143 0.9120
pn 3.2858 5.2488 7.2952 3.8920 5.8585 7.8744 0.6023 2.7193 5.0865
pi 0.0153 0.0703 0.1406 0.0202 0.0769 0.1487 -0.0058 0.0434 0.1100
 5.2516 7.2136 9.156 5.7990 7.7312 9.6133 2.3117 4.5258 6.8877
Table 1. The Impact of Return Rate on The CLSC Network Equilibrium under Different Product BOMs
According to Table 1, it can be observed that no matter which kind of product BOM is, as the
increase of the return rate, the quantities of raw materials produced by the two type suppliers
decrease; on the contrary, the transaction volumes of EOL products between manufacturers
and collectors, the quantity of EOL products used to remanufacture and the total transaction
volumes of products (including new products and remanufactured products) between
manufacturers and retailers increase. More concretely, as the return rate increases, the
increased output of remanufactured products generated from more EOL products available for
reuse is larger than the decreased output of new products due to the reduction of raw
materials provided by the suppliers. The average production cost comes down as a result of
the increase of the EOL products so that the manufacturers prefer to produce more products.
Further, the retailers obtain more products from the manufacturers and sell them at a
relatively lower price, which is benefit for the consumers at the demand markets. All the
channel members and the whole CLSC can get more profits except the suppliers. Base on the
above results, we can draw the conclusions that the increase of the return rate can reduce the
input of raw materials, stimulate the transactions of the CLSC network and boost the economy,
so it is accordance with the philosophy of the sustainable development. 
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Example 2: This example is conducted from Example 1 as follows. We keep the data in
Example 1 but set the maximal production capacity of the two-type suppliers. On this basis,
we investigate the impact of return rate on the equilibrium of the CLSC network under different
product BOMs, as shown in Table 2.
 
b1 = 2, b2 = 1, C1 = 0.5, C2 = 0.25b1 = 1, b2 = 2, C1 = 0.25, C2 = 0.5 b1 = 2, b2 = 2, C1 = 0.5, C2 = 0.5
m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6 m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6 m = 0.4 m = 0.5 m = 0.6
q1 j1m
r 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 0.4952 0.4630
q2 j2m
r 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.4952 0.4630
qm 0.4058 0.4808 0.5896 0.4058 0.4808 0.5896 0.4058 0.4762 0.5460
qm
u 0.1558 0.2308 0.3396 0.1558 0.2308 0.3396 0.1558 0.2286 0.3145
qmn 0.2029 0.2404 0.2948 0.2029 0.2404 0.2948 0.2029 0.2381 0.2730
qnk 0.2029 0.2404 0.2948 0.2029 0.2404 0.2948 0.2029 0.2381 0.2730
qik 0.0812 0.1202 0.1769 0.0812 0.1202 0.1769 0.0812 0.1190 0.1638
qim 0.0779 0.1154 0.1698 0.0779 0.1154 0.1698 0.0779 0.1143 0.1573
rk 33.2995 33.2933 33.2842 33.2995 33.2933 33.2842 33.2995 33.2937 33.2878
π j1 1.7524 1.5735 0.8781 0.3364 0.2977 0.1323 0.6144 0.5357 0.4432
π j2 0.2579 0.2127 0.0384 1.8261 1.6688 1.0052 0.4897 0.4131 0.3360
pm 0.6735 0.8310 1.0718 0.6151 0.7445 0.9444 0.6735 0.8143 0.9120
pn 0.3911 2.8738 6.5891 0.3911 2.8738 6.5891 0.3911 2.7193 5.0865
pi -0.0075 0.0451 0.1308 -0.0075 0.0451 0.1308 -0.0075 0.0434 0.1100
 3.0674 5.5361 8.7081 3.1612 5.6298 8.8019 2.1612 4.5258 6.8877
Table 2. The Impact of Return Rate on the CLSC Network Equilibrium under Different Product BOMs
with Production Capacity Constraints of Suppliers
In Table 2, comparing the equilibrium solutions between the first two symmetric product BOMs
(b1=2, b2=1 and b1=1, b2=2), we can find that with the symmetric capacity constraints, the
production quantity of new and remanufactured products, the transaction volumes between
adjacent echelons and the market prices under the two BOMs are identical when the same
return rate is set. The profits of the retailers and the collectors are equal too. This is because
the capacity constraints limit the supply of the suppliers, which, in turn, makes the quantity of
the new products made by raw materials precisely be equal to 0.25. Moreover, the same return
rate under the two cases of BOMs corresponds to the same quantities of EOL products
collected and remanufactured products. So there is no difference of transaction volumes
between the retailers and the manufacturers, the collectors and the manufacturers, which
further leads to the same pricing and profits of the retailers and the collectors in the two
BOMs. The reason that the profits of the manufacturers and the suppliers are different in two
BOMs lies in that the cost functions of the two-type suppliers are distinct. 
For the last product BOM (b1=2, b2=2), when the return rate is relatively low (m=0.4), the
production capacity constraints limit the supply of raw materials; instead when the return rate
is relatively high (m=0.5 and m=0.6), the quantities of raw materials provided by the suppliers
are equal to that without capacity constraints. It is because the manufactures have two
different channels to meet the market demand in CLSC. If the EOL products available for
remanufacturing are sufficient, the quantity of the raw materials purchased by the
manufacturers need not be up to the maximum capacities of the suppliers.
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Example 3: This example is conducted from Example 1 as follows. We fix the return rate
m  = 0.5, keep the other data in Example 1 but assume the two manufacturers are risk-averse.
They are not only concerned with profit maximization but also risk minimization. Their risk
functions are given by rm=(∑n=1
N
qmn−0.6)
2
. This risk measure can be explained as follows: the
two manufacturers wish to increase the transaction volumes with the retailers in order to sell
more products. On this basis, we investigate the impact of risk-averse degree of the
manufacturer on the equilibrium of the CLSC network under different product BOMs, as shown
in Table 3. 
 
b1 = 2, b2 = 1, m = 0.5 b1 = 1, b2 = 2, m = 0.5 b1 = 2, b2 = 2, m = 0.5
lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4 lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4 lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4
q1 j1m
r 0.5775 0.5777 0.5780 0.2981 0.2982 0.2983 0.4990 0.4996 0.5001
q2 j2m
r 0.2887 0.2889 0.2890 0.5962 0.5963 0.5965 0.4990 0.4996 0.5001
qm 0.5553 0.5555 0.5558 0.5733 0.5734 0.5735 0.4798 0.4804 0.4809
qm
u 0.2665 0.2666 0.2668 0.2752 0.2753 0.2754 0.2303 0.2306 0.2308
qmn 0.2776 0.2778 0.2779 0.2866 0.2867 0.2868 0.2399 0.2402 0.2405
qnk 0.2776 0.2778 0.2779 0.2866 0.2867 0.2868 0.2399 0.2402 0.2405
qik 0.1388 0.1389 0.1389 0.1433 0.1433 0.1434 0.1199 0.1201 0.1202
qim 0.1333 0.1333 0.1334 0.1376 0.1376 0.1377 0.1152 0.1153 0.1154
rk 33.2871 33.2870 33.2870 33.2856 33.2856 33.2855 33.2934 33.2933 33.2933
π j1 0.8005 0.8013 0.8022 0.0666 0.0667 0.0668 0.5470 0.5487 0.5504
π j2 0.0084 0.0086 0.0088 0.6886 0.6890 0.6895 0.4225 0.4239 0.4254
pm 1.0290 1.0250 1.0211 0.9781 0.9756 0.9731 0.7526 0.7430 0.7335
pn 5.4032 5.4113 5.4193 6.0221 6.0272 6.0321 2.8412 2.8600 2.8786
pi 0.0720 0.0721 0.0722 0.0787 0.0787 0.0788 0.0447 0.0449 0.0451
 7.3132 7.3184 7.3235 7.8341 7.8373 7.8404 4.6080 4.6206 4.6330
Table 3. The Impact of Risk-averse Degree of the Manufacturers on the CLSC Network Equilibrium
under Different Product BOMs
According to Table 3, it can be observed that as the risk-averse degree lm increases, the
production quantity of raw materials, new products and remanufactured products, the
collection quantity of EOL products and the transaction volumes between adjacent echelons
increase too. All the channel members and the whole CLSC can get more profits except the
manufacturers. We can explain the results as follows: according to the equilibrium solutions in
the absence of risk aversion in Table 1, it can be found that the optimal transaction volume of
the products between the manufacturer and the retailer is lower than 0.3 under each product
BOM when m=0.5 is set, so the transaction volume between one manufacturer and the two
retailers is less than 0.6. Therefore, based on the given risk functions, the manufacturers need
to purchase more raw materials from the suppliers, buy-back more EOL products from the
collectors and make more products to hedge the risk. The behaviors of the manufacturers
make the transaction volumes of the CLSC network increase and improve the profits of the
other members. However, for the manufacturer himself, there is a conflict between the two
objectives of profit maximization and risk minimization. In other words, if the manufacturers
can give up a part of interests, then the performance of CLSC will be better.
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Example 4: This example takes the two factors of risk aversion of the manufacturers and
capacity constraints of suppliers into account. On this basis, we investigate the impact of risk-
averse degree on the equilibrium of the CLSC network under different product BOMs, as shown
in Table 4. 
 
b1 = 2, b2 = 1, m = 0.5, C1 = 0.5,
C2 = 0.25
b1 = 1, b2 = 2, m = 0.5, C1 = 0.25,
C2 = 0.5
b1 = 2, b2 = 2, m = 0.4, C1 = 0.5,
C2 = 0.5
lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4 lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4 lm = 0.2 lm = 0.3 lm = 0.4
q1 j1m
r 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.4995 0.5000 0.5000
q2 j2m
r 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.4995 0.2500 0.2500
qm 0.4808 0.4808 0.4808 0.4808 0.4808 0.4808 0.4803 0.4808 0.4808
qm
u 0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.2308 0.2305 0.2308 0.2308
qmn 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2401 0.2404 0.2404
qnk 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2404 0.2401 0.2404 0.2404
qik 0.1202 0.1202 0.1202 0.1202 0.1202 0.1202 0.1201 0.1202 0.1202
qim 0.1154 0.1154 0.1154 0.1154 0.1154 0.1154 0.1153 0.1154 0.1154
rk 33.2933 33.2933 33.2933 33.2933 33.2933 33.2933 33.2934 33.2933 33.2933
π j1 1.6412 1.6412 1.6412 0.3178 0.3178 0.3178 0.5484 0.5530 0.5611
π j2 0.2297 0.2297 0.2297 1.7496 1.7496 1.7496 0.4237 0.4280 0.4361
pm 0.7463 0.7463 0.7463 0.6435 0.6435 0.6435 0.7446 0.7300 0.7138
pn 2.8738 2.8738 2.8738 2.8738 2.8738 2.8738 2.8569 2.8738 2.8738
pi 0.0451 0.0451 0.0451 0.0451 0.0451 0.0451 0.0449 0.0451 0.0451
 5.5361 5.5361 5.5361 5.6298 5.6298 5.6298 4.6185 4.6298 4.6298
Table 4. The Impact of Risk-averse Degree of the manufacturers on the CLSC Network Equilibrium
under Different Product BOMs with Production Capacity Constraints of Suppliers
According to Table 4, it can be observed that under the first two kinds of product BOMs (b1=2,
b2=1 and b1= 1 , b2=2), the equilibrium production and remanufacturing quantities, the
equilibrium transaction volumes and the profits of various channel members don’t vary with
the change of the return rate due to the effect of the capacity constraints of the suppliers.
Under the last product BOM (b1= 2 , b2=2), when lm=0.2, the optimal quantities of raw
materials made by the suppliers don’t reach the upper bound of their capacities; whereas as lm
continues to increase to 0.3 and 0.4, the capacity constraints will take effect.
5. Conclusions
We study a CLSC network equilibrium problem considering two-type suppliers, the risk-averse
character of the manufacturers and the capacity constraints of the suppliers comprehensively.
Based on finite-dimensional variational inequality theory, we analyze the optimal behaviors of
various channel members and establish the governing CLSC network equilibrium formulation.
The LQP-PC algorithm is utilized to solve the variational inequality problem. Numerical
examples are given to analyze the impact of return rate and risk-averse degree upon the
network equilibrium under different BOMs. The results show that with the increase of return
rate, the profits of various channel members and the performance of the CLSC system will
improve. With the increase of risk-averse degree, the manufacturers will bear benefit losses. In
other words, there is a contradiction between profit maximization and risk minimization for the
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manufacturers. Moreover, the economic behavior of the CLSC is likely to be limited by the
capacity constraints of the suppliers. 
In the future, we would like to extend our model to study the multi-period CLSC network
equilibrium problem involving multi-type suppliers and risk aversion.
Acknowledgment
The work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation, China (71202142).
References
Atasu, A., Guide, V.D.R., & Wassenhove, L.N. (2008). Product Reuse Economics in Closed-Loop
Supply Chain Research. Production and Operations Management, 17(5), 483-496.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3401/poms.1080.0051
Chen, J.M., & Chang, C.I. (2012). The co-opetitive strategy of a closed-loop supply chain with
remanufacturing. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review,
48(2), 387-400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2011.10.001
Debo, L.G., Toktay, L.B., & Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2005). Market segmentation and product
technology selection for remanufacturable products. Management Science, 51(8),
1193-1205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0369
Ferguson, M.E., & Toktay, L.B. (2006). The effect of competition on recovery strategies.
Production and operations management, 15(3), 351-368. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-
5956.2006.tb00250.x
Golinska, P., & Kawa, A. (2011). Remanufacturing in automotive industry: Challenges and
limitations. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 4(3), 453-466.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2011.v4n3.p453-466
Guide, V.D.R., & Wassenhove, L.N. (2006). Closed‐Loop Supply Chains: An Introduction to the
Feature Issue (Part 1). Production and Operations Management, 15(3), 345-350.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2006.tb00249.x
Hammond, D., & Beullens, P. (2007). Closed-loop supply chain network equilibrium under
legislation. European Journal of Operational Research, 183(2), 895-908. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2006.10.033
He, B.S., Xu, Y., & Yuan, X.M. (2006). A logarithmic-quadratic proximal prediction-correction
method for structured monotone variational inequalities. Computational Optimization and
Applications, 35(1), 19-46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10589-006-6442-4
Keeney, R.L., & Raiffa, H. (1993). Decisions with multiple objectives: preferences and value
trade-offs. London: Cambridge university press.
-527-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1336
Korpelevich, G.M. (1976). The extragradient method for finding saddle points and other
problems. Matecon, 12, 747-756. http://ci.nii.ac.jp/naid/10017556617/
Majumder, P., & Groenevelt, H. (2001). Competition in remanufacturing. Production and
Operations Management, 10(2), 125-141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2001.tb00074.x
Meng, Q., Huang, Y., & Cheu, R.L. (2009). Competitive facility location on decentralized supply
chains. European Journal of Operational Research, 196(2), 487-499. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2008.03.030
Mitra, S., & Webster, S. (2008). Competition in remanufacturing and the effects of government
subsidies. International Journal of Production Economics, 111(2), 287-298. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2007.02.042
Nagurney, A., Cruz, J., Dong, J., & Zhang, D. (2005). Supply chain networks, electronic
commerce, and supply side and demand side risk. European Journal of Operational Research,
164(1), 120-142. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.11.007
Nagurney, A., Dong, J., & Zhang, D. (2002). A supply chain network equilibrium model.
Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 38(5), 281-303.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1366-5545(01)00020-5
Nagurney, A., & Toyasaki, F. (2005). Reverse supply chain management and electronic waste
recycling: a multitiered network equilibrium framework for e-cycling. Transportation
Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 41(1), 1-28. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2003.12.001
Örsdemir, A., Kemahlıoğlu‐Ziya, E., & Parlaktürk, A.K. (2014). Competitive quality choice and
remanufacturing. Production and Operations Management, 23(1), 48-64. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/poms.12040
Qiang, Q., Ke, K., Anderson, T., & Dong, J. (2013). The closed-loop supply chain network with
competition, distribution channel investment, and uncertainties. Omega, 41(2), 186-194.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.omega.2011.08.011
Savaskan, R.C., Bhattacharya, S., & Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2004). Closed-loop supply chain
models with product remanufacturing. Management science, 50(2), 239-252. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1030.0186
Savaskan, R.C., & Van Wassenhove, L.N. (2006). Reverse channel design: the case of
competing retailers. Management Science, 52(1), 1-14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0454
Shi, J., Zhang, G., & Sha, J. (2011). Optimal production planning for a multi-product closed
loop system with uncertain demand and return. Computers & Operations Research, 38(3),
641-650. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2010.08.008
Wakolbinger, T., Toyasaki, F., Nowak, T., & Nagurney, A. (2014). When and for whom would e-
waste be a treasure trove? Insights from a network equilibrium model of e-waste flows.
International Journal of Production Economics, 154, 263-273. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.04.025
-528-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1336
Webster, S., & Mitra, S. (2007). Competitive strategy in remanufacturing and the impact of
take-back laws. Journal of Operations Management, 25(6), 1123-1140. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jom.2007.01.014
Yang, G.F., Wang, Z.P., & Li, X.Q. (2009). The optimization of the closed-loop supply chain
network. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 45(1), 16-28.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2008.02.007
Zhu, X., & Xu, X. (2012). An integrated optimization model of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain
under uncertainty. Journal of System and Management Sciences, 2(3), 9-17.
http://www.aasmr.org/jsms/Vol2/No3/JSMS_Vol2_No3_2.pdf
Zsidisin, G.A. (2003). Managerial perceptions of supply risk. Journal of supply chain
management, 39(4), 14-26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-493X.2003.tb00146.x
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015 (www.jiem.org)
Article's contents are provided on a Attribution-Non Commercial 3.0 Creative commons license. Readers are allowed to copy, distribute
and communicate article's contents, provided the author's and Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management's names are included.
It must not be used for commercial purposes. To see the complete license contents, please visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
-529-
